School of Technology and Computer Science Seminars
Sparsely Supported Correlated Equilibrium
by Dr. Ratnik Gandhi (School of Technology and Computer Science)
Friday, June 22, 2012
from
to
(Asia/Kolkata)
at Colaba Campus ( A-212 (STCS Seminar Room) )
at Colaba Campus ( A-212 (STCS Seminar Room) )
Description |
Correlated equilibria are a generalization of Nash equilibria. Existence of a correlated equilibrium is guaranteed due to existence of a Nash equilibrium. In this talk I will present a result of Germano & Lugosi(2007) that shows every finite normal form game possesses a sparsely supported correlated equilibrium. Ref: Fabrizio Germano & Gábor Lugosi, 2007. "Existence of Sparsely Supported Correlated Equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 575-578, September. |